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Abstract
We investigate the relative merits of unconditional cash transfers (UCT), conditional
cash transfers (CCT), and the effects of improvements in education quality on efficiency
and welfare. In our setting, some parents underinvest in their children’s education
because capital market imperfections prevent them from borrowing. Under sufficiently
accurate targeting, CCT are more effective than UCT in enhancing the efficiency of
these households’ decisions. However, UCT is superior to CCT in terms of welfare
unless targeting is perfect, in which case UCT and CCT are equivalent. Education
quality is welfare improving, but may not be efficiency enhancing when public education
quality is very low.
Keywords: conditional cash transfers, public education, education quality, uncondi-
tional cash transfers, credit constraint, efficiency, welfare.
JEL Classification: H31, H42, H52, I25
1 Introduction
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) have been extensively implemented in developing countries
since the 1990s. These programs provide low-income households with incentives to send their
children to school by tying a cash transfer to school attendance.1 The Mexican Oportunidades
and the Brazilian Bolsa Familia constitute well-known examples of CCT programs.
To justify the implementation of CCT programs, the literature has focused on the exis-
tence of social externalities (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2004), individual irrationality, impa-
tience, or lack of self-control (Das et al., 2005).2 Under these circumstances, it is well-known
that conditional transfers have a larger impact on individual behavior, but in terms of utility
are never superior to unconditional transfers. In contrast, little is known about the effect
of CCT when poverty, combined with the inability to borrow, is the underlying reason for
underinvesting in education, as noted in Das et al. (2005) and Martinelli and Parker (2003).
The large empirical literature evaluating CCT confirms that these programs boost school
enrollment and decrease drop-out rates.3 However, an often-raised concern regarding CCT
is that the increase in school enrollment may not be the most effective way to raise human
capital. Indeed, the impact of CCT in terms of learning is not obvious, since education quality
is typically low in countries adopting CCT (e.g., Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991; Hanushek,
1995; Glewwe, 1999; Reimers et al., 2006). Thus, a natural question is whether increasing
quality would in fact have a larger impact on human capital and, more generally, on lifetime
1In this paper, we focus exclusively on the education component of these programs. Most CCT programs
also place conditions such as regular check-ups and some also include a nutrition counterpart. For a review
of CCT programs, see Das et al. (2005) and Rawlings and Rubio (2005).
2Another rationale for CCT is intra-household bargaining, as discussed in Martinelli and Parker (2003).
Fiszbein et al. (2009) include a comprehensive discussion on the economic rationale for CCT. See also Bour-
guignon et al. (2003).
3Examples of empirical papers focusing on the education component of CCT programs include Attanasio
et al. (2005), Baird et al. (2011), Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011), Behrman et al. (2005), Bursztyn and Coffman
(2012), Coady and Parker (2004), de Brauw and Hoddinott (2010), Dubois et al. (2012), Ferreira et al. (2009),
Maluccio and Flores (2005), Ponce and Bedi (2010), Schady and Araujo (2006), Schultz (2004), Skoufias and
Parker (2001), Souza and Cardoso (2009), and Todd and Wolpin (2006).
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income (efficiency) and utility (welfare).4
In this paper, we consider a two-period model based on Baland and Robinson (2000)
in which parents underinvest in education because they are credit-constrained. In addition,
we explicitly account for the role of education quality on human capital formation. In our
framework, the government provides education free of charge for all households, but this is
not sufficient to induce the efficient amount of time spent at school. This setting allows us to
explore the relative merits of cash transfers (conditional and unconditional) and investments
in education quality in terms of efficiency and welfare for credit-constrained households.
More specifically, we assume that the government has an exogenously given budget that it
can allocate to CCT, UCT, or increasing education quality. Unlike education quality, cash
transfers can be targeted at constrained households, albeit imperfectly. We analyze the effect
of marginal changes in each of the policy parameters separately when the three policies are
in place. Hence, our approach is positive and aims to explore the relative merits of several
commonly used policy instruments.5
In our model there are two inputs, time spent at school and education quality, which can
be substitutes or complements in the human capital production function. Parents choose the
fraction of time their children spend at school during childhood by considering the impact
of this decision on household utility.6 Since CCT are usually paid on a monthly basis over
several years, we model time spent at school as a continuous variable. Each unit of time
the child spends at school generates costs in the first period related to foregone child labor
earnings and other indirect costs such as clothing, materials, and transportation. In return,
it increases household income in the second period. We assume that some households do
4Education quality can be raised by increasing school inputs, such as school facilities or teacher qualifica-
tion. For a comprehensive discussion on education quality, see Hanushek (2006) and Hanushek and Rivkin
(2006).
5Gahvari and Mattos (2007) deal with the optimal design of CCT in the presence of information asym-
metries.
6By focusing on household utility, we allow for inter-generational transfers without explicitly accounting
for these decisions. When intergenerational transfers are interior, considering household utility (as here) or
the utility of the parent and the child separately (as in Baland and Robinson, 2000) yields identical results.
2
not have the means to defray the costs in the first period. Since credit market imperfections
prevent them from borrowing, their children spend an inefficiently low amount of time at
school for any given level of education quality.
Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are a natural instrument to recover efficiency when
poverty is the reason why households underinvest in education. By increasing household
income in the first period, UCT lead credit-constrained households to increase the time their
children spend at school. However, it is unclear whether UCT are more or less effective than
CCT in enhancing efficiency. Indeed, in the presence of market imperfections, distorting
individual behavior by imposing conditions may be more desirable (Lipsey and Lancaster,
1956). We contribute to this debate by investigating, first, the relative effect of UCT and CCT
in terms of efficiency. Second, we explore the conditions under which policies that improve
education quality prove more adequate to recover efficiency. Finally, we also evaluate the
different policies from a welfare viewpoint.
We obtain the following results: when constrained households can be perfectly targeted,
CCT are more efficiency enhancing than UCT, as in the previous literature. In contrast,
both types of cash transfers are equivalent in terms of welfare. This happens for two reasons.
First, if households were not credit-constrained, their choice of time spent at school would be
optimal.7 Thus, they increase the time spent at school when the credit constraint is relaxed,
which happens both with an UCT and CCT (of equal amount). Second, CCT change the
unit price of education, but allow households to adjust their behavior at the margin.8
These results may change when targeting is imperfect. Given that children in constrained
households spend less time at school than those in unconstrained households, constrained
7This is a consequence of the absence of externalities and the fact that households are not irrational or
impatient.
8Alternatively, CCT can be seen as a lump-sum transfer conditional on having achieved a pre-established
threshold of time spent at school. In that case, the transfer may push household choice to a corner where
satisfying the requirement and receiving the transfer is better than not, but households would be better off
if the transfer were not conditional on the amount of time spent at school. In our view, when studying
household choice over the lifetime, the number of periods over which the transfer is received is large, and the
continuous approach adopted in this paper is more appropriate.
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households receive less income under CCT than UCT. This undermines the positive effects
of CCT on efficiency and makes UCT superior to CCT in terms of welfare for constrained
households. We provide an empirical illustration of the comparison of UCT and CCT in
terms of efficiency using the Colombian setting. For commonly used utility functions, our
results indicate that CCT are always superior to UCT in terms of efficiency in the Colombian
context.
We also show that raising education quality always increases welfare, especially when
education quality is low. The effect raising quality has on efficiency is more involved. In
particular, not only do households respond to changes in quality by increasing or decreasing
the time their children spend at school, depending on the human capital technology, but
also changing quality modifies the efficient amount of time spent at school. Surprisingly,
our model suggests that, when quality is very low, improving education quality may not be
efficiency enhancing. Although we cannot derive general results, we indicate how the model
can be empirically tested so that the effect of improving quality on efficiency can be assessed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
alternative policies, then identifies the first best, and the credit-constrained solution. Sections
3 and 4 evaluate the effects of revenue-neutral changes on the policies in terms of efficiency
and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A household is composed of one parent and one child and lives for two periods. The parent
is endowed with a units of efficient labor (or units of human capital) and the child is en-
dowed with one unit of efficient labor. The wage per unit of efficient labor is w, determined
exogenously in competitive markets.
In the first period, the parent works, supplying her efficient labor inelastically. She decides
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on the allocation of her child’s time between school, e, and work 1− e, and on the amount of
savings s. These are the only economic decisions, they are made by the parent, and determine
household consumption of the numeraire good in the first and second periods.
We assume the existence of a public school that transforms q units of the numeraire into
one unit of education of quality q (Besley and Coate, 1991). The tuition cost, qe, is covered
by the government. For households, the cost of acquiring e units of education is the earnings
forgone by children we and other indirect costs of education such as transportation, books,
or clothing κe. Households consume c1 and save s.
In the second period the child (now an adult) works, supplying h(e, q) efficiency units
of labor. The function h is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave in its two arguments. We allow for e and q to be complements, heq(e, q) > 0, or
substitutes, heq(e, q) < 0.
9 Consumption in the second period, c2, is the sum of the parent’s
savings and the child’s labor income, wh(e, q).
Finally, capital markets are imperfect, so that parents can save but cannot borrow, i.e.,
s > 0. When the parental endowment of efficient labor a is low, households are credit-
constrained, and their only source of revenue in the second period is the child’s labor income.
When a is large, households are unconstrained. We denote ai with i = {c, u} the endowment
of a constrained/unconstrained household. There is a mass of households of size 1 and λ is
the proportion of households with endowment ac.
10
There are two policies aimed at constrained households: an unconditional cash transfer
(UCT), υ, and a conditional cash transfer (CCT), θe. The government cannot target con-
strained households perfectly, so that only a proportion α of them receives these transfers. In
contrast, a proportion β of the 1− λ unconstrained households also receives these transfers.
9This corresponds to the concept of q-complements and q-substitutes defined by Hicks (1970).
10For simplicity, we assume that ac is sufficiently low so that households remain constrained even after
receiving government transfers.
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The government budget constraint is given by:
B = [λα + (1− λ) β] υ + [λαebc + (1− λ) βebu] (θ + q) + [λ (1− α) enc + (1− λ) (1− β) enu] q,
(1)
where eji denotes the time spent at school by household ij, where i = {c, u} and j = {b, n}
for beneficiary and non-beneficiary of the transfers.
We assume that public policies are financed by an exogenously given budget, e.g., provided
by an international organization, such as The World Bank. This is equivalent to assuming
that individuals do not anticipate the effect of those policies on taxes. This is done for
simplicity of exposition, since allowing for lump-sum taxes does not change our qualitative
results (see Del Rey and Estevan, 2011). We also assume that agents receive a zero interest
rate on their savings and that they do not discount future utility. We assume that all policies
are in place and we evaluate the effect of raising UCT, CCT, and education quality that is
provided free of charge to families.
We now turn to the parent’s choice of e and s. Household utility is denoted:
U ji = U(c
j
1i) + U(c
j
2i). (2)
In the first period, the household’s budget constraint is:
cb1i = wai + w(1− e)− κe+ υ + θe− s, (3)
if the household receives the transfer, and
cn1i = wai + w(1− e)− s, (4)
otherwise. Second period consumption is given by:
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cj2i = s+ wh(e, q), (5)
for all j. Parents maximize (2) with respect to e and s, subject to (3) or (4), and (5),
and the constraint that s ≥ 0. First-order conditions are sufficient for maximization since
the second-order conditions are satisfied. When choosing e, parents equalize the marginal
cost and the marginal benefit of spending time at school in terms of household utility. For
beneficiary households:
(w + κ− θ)U ′ (cb1i) = whe(ebi , q)U ′ (cb2i) and ebi > 0, (6)
assuming that there is an interior optimal solution for e when θ < w + κ. Thus, we restrict
our analysis to the cases where the CCT does not cover all the costs related to education, as
supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Schultz, 2004). If they do, the optimal choice of e is
1. Similarly, for non-beneficiaries:
(w + κ)U ′ (cn1i) = whe(e
n
i , q)U
′ (cn2i) and e
n
i > 0. (7)
The optimal choice of s is given by:
U ′
(
cj2u
)
= U ′
(
cj1u
)
and sju > 0, (8)
U ′
(
cj2c
)
< U ′
(
cj1c
)
and sjc = 0. (9)
When households are unconstrained, they choose the amount of savings that equalizes marginal
utility in both periods. When they are credit constrained, savings are zero and the marginal
utility of first-period consumption is larger: parents would like to borrow, but are prevented
from doing so by credit market imperfections.
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2.1 Benchmark: Unconstrained Solution without Transfers
In the absence of transfers (υ = θ = 0) and when the savings choice is interior, we combine
(7) and (8) to obtain:
whe (eu, q) = (w + κ) . (10)
Condition (10) characterizes the amount of time spent at school that maximizes household
lifetime income, i.e., the efficient level of e. This is given by the equality between the marginal
benefit, whe (e, q), and the marginal cost of time spent at school accrued to the household,
(w + κ). Thus, for unconstrained households the decision concerning education investment
maximizes utility and is efficient.11
2.2 Constrained Solution without Transfers
When households are too poor, since they cannot borrow, their children spend an inefficiently
low amount of time at school, as in Baland and Robinson (2000). Indeed, combining (7) and
(9):
whe (ec, q) > (w + κ) . (11)
The inefficiency arises from the fact that the marginal benefit of time spent at school is
larger than its marginal cost. Increasing e would require transferring income from the second
to the first period to cover education costs, and this cannot be done due to the borrowing
constraint.
11Note that this differs from global efficiency since education is provided free of charge by the govern-
ment. Fully accounting for all the costs and benefits of investing in education would require a more general
framework, allowing for social externalities among other considerations.
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3 Efficiency
In order to explore the relative merits of alternative policies (UCT, CCT, and improvements
in education quality) in enhancing efficiency in the education decision of credit-constrained
households, we define:
Ic = whe (ec, q)− (w + κ) > 0, (12)
as the inefficiency of the decision concerning time spent at school by constrained house-
holds.12
3.1 Cash Transfers
An increase in UCT reduces the inefficiency of the decision of constrained households who
benefit from the transfers:
dIbc
dυ
= whee
(
ebc, q
) debc
dυ
< 0,
since, by (6) and the implicit function theorem, when s = 0:13
debc
dυ
= − −(w + κ− θ)U
′′ (cb1c)
(w + κ− θ)2 U ′′ (cb1c)+ (whe(ebc, q))2 U ′′ (cb2c)+ whee(ebc, q)U ′ (cb2c) > 0. (13)
By increasing income in the first period, an increase in UCT reduces the marginal utility
of first-period consumption, and by (6), the marginal cost of investing in education. As a
result, an increase in UCT always increases the amount of time the child spends at school,
reducing the inefficiency of the education decision. This effect is intrinsically related to the
relaxation of the credit constraint.
We now show that an increase in CCT also reduces the inefficiency of the constrained
12Using (7) and (9), we obtain whe(ec, q) = (w + κ)
U ′(c1c)
U ′(c2c)
> (w + κ), since the household is constrained,
i.e. U ′(c1c) > U ′(c2c). Although there are in principle two ways of enhancing efficiency, lowering
U ′(c1c)
U ′(c2c)
or
whe(ec, q)− (w + κ), they are univocally related, and both approaches yield similar qualitative results.
13Since s = 0, we only need to study the marginal effects on the education decision through (6).
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household decisions:
dIbc
dθ
= whee
(
ebc, q
) debc
dθ
< 0,
since, proceeding as before:
debc
dθ
= − U
′ (cb1c)− (w + κ− θ)ebcU ′′ (cb1c)
(w + κ− θ)2 U ′′ (cb1c)+ (whe(ebc, q))2 U ′′ (cb2c)+ whee(ebc, q)U ′ (cb2c) > 0. (14)
Similar to UCT, the increase in CCT reduces the marginal cost of first-period consumption
in terms of utility, leading to more time spent at school. As before, this effect alleviates
the credit constraint. Moreover, the reduction in the marginal cost is now enhanced by the
reduction in the price of education due to θ.
In order to compare the two policies, we now evaluate the effect of raising θ while reducing
υ in order to keep the budget balanced. The effect of this change on inefficiency is given by
Υθ,υc =
dIbc
dθ
dθ + dIc
dυ
dυ and, from (1), it is required that:
dυ = −λαe
b
c + (1− λ) βebu
λα + (1− λ) β dθ (15)
for given ebc and e
b
u. Using (15):
Υθ,υc = hee
(
ebc, q
)(debc
dθ
− de
b
c
dυ
λαebc + (1− λ) βebu
λα + (1− λ) β
)
dθ. (16)
Plugging (13) and (14) into (16):
Υθ,υc = hee
(
ebc, q
)−U ′ (cb1c)+ (w + κ− θ)ebcU ′′ (cb1c)− (w + κ− θ)U ′′ (cb1c)
(
λαebc+(1−λ)βebu
λα+(1−λ)β
)
(w + κ− θ)2 U ′′ (cb1c)+ (whe(ebc, q))2 U ′′ (cb2c)+ whee(ebc, q)U ′ (cb2c)
 dθ
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the numerator, since hee < 0 and the sign
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of the denominator is also negative:
sign
(
Υθ,υc
)
= sign
(
−U ′ (cb1c)− (w + κ− θ)U ′′ (cb1c)
[
(1− λ) β (ebu − ebc)
λα + (1− λ) β
])
(17)
If constrained households can be perfectly targeted, i.e., β = 0, CCT are always more effective
than UCT in reducing the inefficiency of the decision of constrained households who are
beneficiaires, by (17). Indeed, CCT induce a higher increase in time spent at school through
the price effect. CCT are clearly more distortive than UCT since they are conditioned on
behavior. Still, in the presence of market imperfections, this result shows that it may be
desirable to introduce additional distortions, in line with the Theory of the Second Best
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
When unconstrained households cannot be excluded from receiving the transfer, i.e.,
β > 0, it is unclear whether UCT or CCT are the best policy in terms of efficiency. On the
one hand, CCT has a larger effect on behavior through the price effect. On the other hand,
constrained households receive less with CCT than with UCT, since their children spend less
time at school than unconstrained households. Rearranging (17), CCT are more effective
than UCT in reducing the inefficiency if:
β (1− λ)
αλ+ β (1− λ) <
1
(ebu − ebc) (w + κ− θ)
(
−U ′′(c
b
1c)
U ′(cb1c)
) . (18)
This condition will be more easily satisfied the better the targeting of constrained households,
i.e., the larger α and/or the smaller β, the smaller the difference in time spent at school by chil-
dren in constrained and unconstrained households, and/or the smaller (w+κ−θ)
(
−U
′′(cb1c)
U ′(cb1c)
)
.
For a logarithmic utility function, this last term reduces to (w + κ− θ) /cb1c, i.e., the net cost
of a unit of time spent at school relative to the first period consumption of a constrained
household. It is then easy to verify that if consumption of constrained families is sufficiently
11
high relative to the net cost of education, this condition will always be satisfied. Next we
show an example where this is indeed the case.
3.1.1 A quantitative example comparing CCT and UCT on efficiency grounds
Since all the parameters and variables in (18) are observable, we can perform some back-
of-the-envelope calculations to obtain an approximate targeting threshold that ensures that
CCT are superior to UCT in terms of efficiency. As an illustration, we consider the Colombian
case. Colombia introduced the CCT program Famı´lias en Accio´n in 2001. The program
is targeted at households classified as level 1 in SISBEN,14 which implies that 24.6% of
Colombian households are eligible for it (DNP, 2003, p.131). Assuming that households
classified at level 1 are constrained, λ = 0.246. The proportion of eligible households receiving
the transfer is around 70.2% and the monthly transfer, θ, is 28,000 Colombian pesos for
children aged 12 to 17 (DAPR-FIP-DNP, 2004, pp.1 and 110). In 2003, the average monthly
revenue of families in the first quintile of the income distribution (wai + w + θe
b
c) is 94,346
COP (DNP, 2006). Angrist et al. (2002) estimate that the annual private cost associated
with public schooling, κ, is 58 US dollars, or 14,023 COP on a monthly basis (1 USD=2,901
COP in 2003). For net education costs, w + κ − θ, we also use average monthly child
labor earnings, w, equal to 33,091 COP (DANE/OIT-IPEC, 2001, p.62). Finally, the school
attendance rates of the population aged 12 to 17 is on average 72.5 % for the three first income
deciles and 83.2 % for the rest of the population in 2003 (Gordillo and Ramirez, 2005, p.5).
Since we assume that families do not save, consumption cb1c equals revenues minus the costs
of schooling wai + w + (θ − κ − w)eb, i.e., cb1c = 60, 188. Combining this information in
(18) with a logarithmic utility function, we obtain that CCT transfers are superior to UCT
transfers for all β ∈ [0, 1]: even if all unconstrained families receive the transfers, the positive
14SISBEN, Selection System for Beneficiaries (in Spanish, Sistema de Identificacio´n de Beneficiarios) clas-
sifies households and individuals into six levels of income based on surveys conducted at the household level.
See DNP (2003) for more information on SISBEN.
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effect of CCT on the efficiency of constrained families behavior outweighs the loss due to the
additional cost of funding unconstrained families in Colombia.
3.2 Education Quality
In this section we disentangle the conditions under which quality improvements reduce the
inefficiency of constrained households’ decisions. In our model, since all children attend the
same school system, any policy affecting education quality necessarily affects all households.
For credit-constrained households, an increase in q has the following effect on the time children
spend at school:
debc
dq
= − wheq(e
b
c, q)U
′ (cb2c)+ whq(ebc, q)whe(ebc, q)U ′′ (cb2c)
(w + κ− θ)2 U ′′ (cb1c)+ (whe(ebc, q))2 U ′′ (cb2c)+ whee(ebc, q)U ′ (cb2c) , (19)
by (6) and the implicit function theorem with s = 0.
If e and q are complements, there are two opposite effects on time spent at school. On the
one hand, households have an incentive to increase time spent at school since the marginal
productivity of e is larger when q increases. On the other hand, households can attain the
same income in the second period by devoting less time to school and therefore have an
incentive to decrease e. The larger q is, the lower the second effect is (by concavity of the
human capital function) and the more likely it is that parents increase their children’s time
at school as a response to an increase in quality. If e and q are substitutes, both effects
go in the same direction: the marginal productivity of e falls and the same income in the
second period can be attained with less time at school. Thus, in this case, an increase in q
unambiguously decreases the time spent at school chosen by constrained households.
The literature shows mixed results on the impact of improvements in school quality on
school attendance. Banerjee et al. (2007) evaluate the impact of two school interventions
in India designed to increase quality and show that they fail to increase attendance levels.
13
In contrast, Aker et al. (forthcoming), Bommier and Lambert (2000), Handa (2002), Lavy
(1996), and Paxson and Schady (2002) find positive effects of school quality on school atten-
dance. According to our model, both types of evidence are consistent with complementarity
between q and e.
Even if time spent at school increases as a result of quality improvements, this does not
guarantee that efficiency increases. In contrast to UCT and CCT, an increase in quality
alters the efficient level of time spent at school itself. This can be seen by differentiating
(11) with respect to q:
dIbc
dq
= whee
(
ebc, q
) debc
dq
+ wheq
(
ebc, q
)
. (20)
The first term in (20) represents the change in time spent at school following an increase in
q. The second term in (20) represents the change in the efficient level of e. More precisely,
heq (e, q) is the direct effect of quality on the marginal productivity of time spent at school.
It is positive (negative) when time spent at school and education quality are complements
(substitutes), implying that the efficient level of e increases (decreases) following the increase
in q. For a given choice of e, the inefficiency increases (decreases) due to this second term.
Thus, if heq (e, q) > 0, parents may increase the time their children spend at school, but
the efficient level of investment also increases following an increase in q. In contrast, if
heq (e, q) < 0, parents reduce their children’s time at school when quality increases, but the
efficient e also goes down.
3.2.1 An estimation strategy to test the model predictions
In order to extend the investigation further, we put (19) and (20) together. Raising q will
reduce the inefficiency of time children spend at school if and only if:
wheq
(
ebc, q
)
<
whee
(
ebc, q
)
U ′
(
cb2c
)
D
+
whq(e
b
c, q)whe(e
b
c, q)whee
(
ebc, q
)
U ′′
(
cb2c
)
D
(21)
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where D ≡ (w + κ− θ)2 U ′′ (cb1c) + (whe(ebc, q))2 U ′′ (cb2c) < 0. A threshold of complemen-
tarity/substitutability of e and q is implicitly defined by this expression. Since heq affects
the decision variable, we cannot isolate this threshold. Still, we can test condition (21) if we
assume specific functional forms for the utility and production function.
This would require the estimation of the education production function h(e, q). The
dependent variable should be a measure of achievement, such as test scores or adult pro-
ductivity, and the explanatory variables should include school quality measures (possibly
aggregated in an index) and school attendance. In order to allow for a flexible production
function, one should allow for non-linearities and interaction effects between e and q. An
example of a regression function would be:
h(e, q) = γ0 + γ1e+ γ2q + γ3e
2 + γ4q
2 + γ5eq + γ6e
2q2 + ε.
In this case, he = γ1 + 2γ3e+ γ5q+ 2γ6eq
2, hq = γ2 + 2γ4q+ γ5e+ 2γ6e
2q, hee = 2γ3 + 2γ6q
2
and heq = γ5 + 4γ6eq. Then, by assuming an explicit functional form for the utility function,
our model can be used to predict the effect of raising quality on efficiency.15
For example, if hee
(
ebc, q
)
is 0 (i.e., γ3 and γ6 are not significant), we see that heq
(
ebc, q
)
< 0
becomes a necessary and sufficient condition for an increase in quality to lead to an increase
in efficiency, from (21). Nevertheless, there is little evidence for substitutability in developing
countries, as discussed above. In the case of complements, an increase in q may lead to a
reduction in inefficiency when the second term on the right-hand side of (21) is smaller in
absolute value than the first term. Interestingly, the lower the quality and/or children’s time
spent at school, the larger the second term on the right-hand side of (21) by the concavity
of h, making it less likely that increases in quality lead to a reduction in inefficiency.
15For instance, if the estimated production function is h (e, q) = γ3e2+γ5eq with γ3 < 0 and γ5 > 0 (e and
q complements), it can be shown that raising quality increases the time children spend at school following
an increase in quality and that the inefficiency of this decision also increases.
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It can be argued that even if raising quality moves the ideal level of time spent at school
further up, we should value the fact that children spend more time at higher quality schools
when e and q are sufficiently strong complements. This would be particularly so in the
presence of a social externality that increases with school quality. Still, our model suggests
that it is better to first eliminate the inefficiency, i.e., the credit constraint, and then raise
quality. It can be shown that once households are unconstrained, raising quality does not
affect the efficiency, unlike CCT, and it raises output.
4 Welfare
In this section, we focus on the effect of cash transfers and education quality on constrained
household utility. We start with cash transfers. Using (1)-(5) with and s = 0 and applying
the envelope theorem, we obtain that an increase in UCT raises the welfare of constrained
households:
dU bc
dυ
= U ′
(
cb1c
)
> 0. (22)
An increase in CCT also raises the welfare of credit-constrained households, but this effect
is proportional to the amount of time their children spend at school:
dU bc
dθ
= ebcU
′ (cb1c) > 0. (23)
As before, we consider the effect of raising θ while reducing υ in order to keep the budget
balanced and, using (15), we find the following effect on the welfare of constrained households:
W θ,υc = −U ′
(
cb1c
)((1− λ) β (ebu − ebc)
λα + (1− λ) β
)
dθ < 0 if ebu > e
b
c.
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When unconstrained households do not benefit from the transfers, i.e., β = 0 , UCT and
CCT involving the same budget have the same effect in terms of income. Thus, the credit
constraint is relaxed to the same extent in both cases and the effect on welfare is equivalent.
In Section 3 we have seen that UCT and CCT have different impacts on the choice of time
spent at school. However, because households equalize marginal costs and benefits when
choosing e, the final effect of the change from UCT to CCT on welfare is nil.
In contrast, when β > 0, the welfare effect of UCT is larger than the effect of CCT
for constrained households. While UCT are equally shared among all beneficiaries, CCT
are based on time spent at school, which is smaller for constrained households than for
unconstrained households. As a result, constrained households receive a lower transfer under
CCT than under UCT for a given global budget.
The effect of raising quality on the welfare of constrained households is positive.Using
(1)-(5) with s = 0 and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain:
dU jc
dq
= whq
(
ejc, q
)
U ′
(
cj2c
)
> 0. (24)
We now compare the welfare effects of transfers and education quality. Using (1), (22),
and (24), the welfare effect of simultaneously increasing education quality and reducing UCT
for a given budget is given by:
W q,υc = whq
(
ebc, q
)
U ′
(
cb2c
)− U ′ (cb1c) λαebc + (1− λ) βebu + λ (1− α) enc + (1− λ) (1− β) enuλα + (1− λ) β .
(25)
We know that for constrained households, U ′
(
cb1c
)
> U ′
(
cb2c
)
. Thus, the larger (in abso-
lute value) the second term in (25) is relative to the first, the more severe the household
credit constraint is. In contrast, low quality contributes to a higher welfare effect of quality
improvements due to the concavity of h.16
16If increases in education quality could be targeted at constrained households, the second term on the
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Summing up, CCT and UCT are equivalent in terms of welfare if constrained households
can be perfectly targeted. Otherwise, UCT are preferred to CCT by constrained households.
The effect of quality on welfare is positive. The comparison of the welfare effects of transfers
and quality are not clear cut and need to be carefully examined in each particular case.
The severity of the credit constraint and the fact that cash transfers can be targeted, albeit
imperfectly, support cash transfers over raising quality. Finally, the lower the initial level of
education quality, the higher its marginal productivity and positive welfare effects.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact on efficiency and welfare of three alternative policies
(UCT, CCT and improvements in education quality) aimed at households that spend an
inefficiently low amount of time at school due to credit constraints.
When constrained households can be perfectly targeted, we show that CCT are more
efficiency enhancing than UCT because they not only relax the credit constraint, but also
change the unit price of education. In contrast, for a given budget both cash transfers are
equivalent in terms of welfare. We also show that these results depend on the precision of
the targeting mechanism. Under sufficiently precise targeting, CCT are more effective than
UCT in enhancing efficiency, but they are only equivalent in terms of welfare if targeting is
perfect.
Improving education quality by investing in schools, teachers, or any education input
other than time spent at school, also increases welfare, especially when education quality is
low, as in developing countries. However, the effects of improving education quality in terms
of efficiency are less clear cut. We provide a testable condition that allows us to predict the
impact of increasing quality on the efficiency of the constrained household decisions. Our
right-hand side of (25) would be smaller, and the benefits of increasing q would be larger. All the other
qualitative results would remain the same.
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analysis suggests that when quality is low, cash transfers can be best in terms of efficiency,
but not in terms of welfare.
In our model, time spent at school is a continuous variable and CCT, paid by unit of
time, change the price of education. This is the most appropriate approach when considering
decisions over the lifetime, as we do in this paper. Alternatively, CCT could be conditional
upon achieving a pre-determined threshold of school participation. In this case household
decisions could be distorted at the margin, and the equivalence of CCT and UCT in terms
of welfare, when constrained households can be targeted, would no longer hold.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the literature has focused on arguments other than
credit constraints to justify the implementation of CCT programs. Accounting for positive
externalities of education would certainly increase the positive effects of time spent at school,
but our qualitative results would remain unchanged. In contrast, accounting for arguments
such as irrationality and self-control problems would increase the attractiveness of CCT
relative to the other policies. Our approach allows to identify the conditions under which
CCT are best, even when these arguments are neglected.
We have also neglected the effect of the different policies on taxes paid by the households.
This has the advantage of isolating the impact of expenditures from any distortive effect of
taxation. A previous version of this work considered a very simple structure of taxation with
uniform lump-sum taxes paid on the second period and obtained similar qualitative results.
It would be interesting to consider alternative sources of revenue more specific to developing
countries. We leave these issues for future research.
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